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The Migration Information Source provides fresh thought, authoritative data from numerous global organizations and governments, and global analysis of international migration and refugee trends. A unique, online resource, the Source offers useful tools, vital data, and essential facts on the movement of people worldwide.

Working with a team of international correspondents, we chronicle global migration movements, provide perspectives on current migration debates, and offer the tools and data from numerous global organizations and governments needed to understand migration. We do this in a way that is accessible to researchers, policy makers, journalists, and other opinion shapers.

Our advisory board and other prominent migration scholars who contribute to The Source include some of the most respected voices in the migration and refugee fields. The Source also relies on the good will of several global organizations and governments who make their data and research publicly available on our site.

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Table of Contents

I.	Defining 'Foreign Born' and 'Foreigner' in International Migration Statistics	4
	<i>by Elizabeth Grieco</i>	
II.	Statistics on Forced Migration	7
	<i>by Bela Hovy</i>	
III.	Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data	9
	<i>by Frank Laczko</i>	
IV.	The New Immigrant Survey in the US: The Experience over Time	14
	<i>by Guillermina Jasso, Douglas S. Massey, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P. Smith</i>	
V.	The Global Dimensions of Female Migration	17
	<i>by Hania Zlotnik</i>	
VI.	Building a Gender and Age-Sensitive Approach to Refugee Protection	20
	<i>by Bela Hovy</i>	
VII.	Can UN Migration Recommendations Be Met in Europe?	22
	<i>by Michel Poulain and Nicolas Perrin</i>	
VIII.	New Estimates of the Undocumented Population in the United States	26
	<i>by Jeffrey Passel</i>	

Defining 'Foreign Born' and 'Foreigner' in International Migration Statistics

By Elizabeth Grieco

Migration Policy Institute

July 1, 2002

Contrary to popular belief, numbers are not always "just numbers." As social scientists point out, many official statistics released by government agencies reflect the culture and history of the country in which they are generated. All aspects of a data collection system—from what data are collected, to the questions asked on surveys and censuses, even to what data are ultimately analyzed and disseminated—are influenced by this same context. Thus, official statistics actually embody socio-cultural influences that can prove to be problematic when attempting to compare data from different countries.

Like other official numbers, international migration statistics also reflect the culture and history of the country in which they are generated. Throughout the world, countries demarcate their national identities by defining what seem to be immutable migration-related concepts, such as "migrant," "immigrant," or "citizen," in distinct ways. This variability has a direct impact on the way the governments of those countries collect, process, and present migration data—and on the ability of data users to make direct comparisons among countries.

Models of Citizenship: *Jus soli* and *Jus Sanguinis*

The influence of socio-cultural norms and historical experiences on migration statistics is best illustrated in the similar-yet-different concepts of "foreign born" and "foreigner," both of which are rooted in and reflect very different models of citizenship. In general, the majority of people around the world acquire citizenship in one of two ways: "by birth" (*jus soli*) or "by blood" (*jus sanguinis*). Although these are "ideal types," they remain useful in explaining the divergent outcomes of citizenship policies. In a *jus soli* system, citizenship is based on place of birth. Although there are exceptions to this rule, in general, people born in these countries are citizens, while people born outside are non-citizens. Thus, in a *jus soli* context, the term "foreign born" refers to residents of a country who were born in another country. Foreign-born residents can, under certain circumstances, change their status and become citizens through naturalization. When combined, both place of birth and citizenship status can be used to divide the population into three categories—native-born citizens, foreign-born citizens, and non-citizens—and define who among the foreign born has acquired the full rights and responsibilities bestowed on all citizens.


In a *jus sanguinis* system, descent and heritage play a pivotal role in defining who is, and can become, a citizen. *Where* people were born is not as important as *if* and *how* they can trace their ancestry back to the origin country. In this context, the term "foreigner" refers to those in the population whose heritage *cannot* be traced back to the host country. In general, under *jus sanguinis* citizenship policies, it is often difficult—though not impossible—for foreigners to naturalize, even if they are long-term residents or were native born to the country. Those foreigners who do naturalize typically have to demonstrate that they meet the required "integration" criteria, such as language skills or knowledge of the country's culture and history. While it is often difficult for resident foreigners to naturalize, it is usually easier for foreign-born ethnics to obtain citizenship after immigrating back to their ancestral "homeland," in some cases even if their families have lived abroad for generations. In this sense, the concept of foreigner divides a country's resident population—and, indeed, the world's population—into two groups: nationals, who have the right of citizenship by virtue of their ancestry, and foreigners, who must earn the right to naturalize.

Foreign Born v. Foreigner: Reflecting Alternative Views of Citizenship

These outlines of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* citizenship policies are, as noted, ideal types. In fact, most countries, while generally emphasizing one or the other, have increasingly blurred the distinction between the two by including elements of both in their broader procedures. However, the preeminence of either a "by birth" or "by blood" citizenship policy simultaneously reflects and defines how a country views "membership" and who does, and does not, belong. This, in turn, influences how individuals in a country's population are classified administratively and how they are counted in official statistics.

The influence of varying citizenship policies on migration statistics can be clearly seen when data from the United States and Germany are put side-by-side. Two examples will be presented here, with the first focusing on "stock" data and the other on "flow" data. Both the United States and Germany data discussed in these examples are available in The Source's Global Data Center.

Stock data represent "snapshots" of a population at a single point in time by counting (as in a census) or estimating (as in a survey) the distribution of that population according to some characteristic, such as age, income, or sex. An example of stock data would be the distribution of all foreign persons in a population by their country of origin. However, who is included in the category of "foreign persons" will depend on whether the dominant citizenship policy of a country is *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*.



In the United States, where the citizenship policy is predominantly *jus soli*, "foreign persons" refers to all foreign born in the resident population and includes both naturalized citizens and non-citizens. In Germany, where a *jus sanguinis* policy dominates, "foreign persons" generally refers to anyone in the resident population who is a non-citizen and *not* of German descent, that is, both foreign-born and native-born foreigners who have not naturalized. However, it *does not* include either ethnic Germans who were born abroad and were awarded citizenship after immigration or non-German foreign-born persons who have naturalized; these individuals are considered to be, or to have become, nationals. As a result, while the concepts of foreign born and foreigner initially appear similar, they actually categorize people in fundamentally different ways. This makes it difficult to compare directly the migration stock data of the United States and Germany.

A similar problem exists when attempting to compare flow data. Flow data are collected and produced by governmental administrative agencies. Unlike stock data, they are collected continuously but are usually presented in an aggregate form for a point in time, such as monthly or annual statistics. A good example of flow data is the number of immigrants entering a country, since immigration is a process that occurs continuously and is catalogued year-round. Depending on whether the citizenship policy of a country is predominantly *jus soli* or *jus sanguinis*, the term "immigrant" can include very different categories of people.



In the United States, immigrant inflow data include foreign-born persons who are non-citizens entering the country for lawful permanent residence. In Germany, immigrant inflow data also include foreign-born persons who are non-citizens entering the country legally, but not all foreign born are considered immigrants. Specifically, *Aussiedler*, or ethnic Germans born in eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, who meet certain requirements, have the right to enter Germany virtually as citizens. While they are enumerated in the inflow data, the *Aussiedler* are not considered immigrants but rather "returning nationals." This orientation also helps to explain why German citizens who have returned to Germany after long-term stays abroad are also included in the inflow data. In the United States, immigrant inflow data documents the arrival of the foreign born, while in Germany it documents both the arrival of the foreign population and the "return" of ethnic nationals.

Implications for the Comparability of International Migration Data

While it is generally assumed that statistics passively and objectively reflect the event or process they measure, in reality, they do so subjectively—in the context of the history and culture of the society in which they are produced. These socio-cultural influences can be seen in the varied concepts, legal definitions, and administrative classifications used to generate and report migration data— and this variation means that international migration statistics are often difficult to compare. Concepts and terms that may initially appear to include the same categories of people, such as "foreign born" and "foreigner" or even "immigrant," may actually encompass very different groups. This means that the rate and trend statistics generated from these data, such as "percentage of foreign persons in the total population" or "annual number of immigrants," are often not directly comparable.

Do these differences mean that comparative analyses of international migration trends and levels should not be pursued? Of course not. Fortunately, many governments recognize the problems associated with these differences and, encouraged by support from various international agencies, are moving their statistics in the direction of greater comparability. However, change takes time and, as of today, there are still migration-related concepts and terms that remain problematic in an international context. It is therefore essential for users to be aware of the existence of differences and to make every effort to understand how those differences affect the comparability of the data. This is important, because it is the degree of comparability that will determine the qualifications associated with any conclusions drawn.

Suggested Readings

Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.) (2000) *From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Starr, Paul (1987) "The Sociology of Official Statistics." Pp. 7-57 in William Alonso and Paul Starr (eds.), *The Politics of Numbers*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Statistics on Forced Migration

By Bela Hovy

September 1, 2002

Reporting on a UN meeting, a recent *New York Times* article lamented the poor state of international migration data. The story ("UN Coaxes Out the Wheres and Whys of Global Immigration," July 7, 2002) points out a lack of official data and harmonized definitions, weak analytical tools, and abuse by officials as the underlying reasons for this deplorable situation.

However, the above assessment does not apply to all aspects of international population movements. The picture for asylum and refugee statistics, for instance, appears less bleak. Statistics on international forced migration are available for virtually all countries, are frequently updated, and are comparable among countries. What is the main reason for this qualitative difference between asylum and refugee statistics on the one hand, and those on international migration on the other?

A Wealth of Statistics

Four critical factors contribute to the relative wealth of refugee and asylum statistics. First, there is the global refugee convention. Most countries have signed the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and have implemented the provisions in their national laws.

Second, the convention clearly defines who a refugee is: someone who is living outside his or her country of origin and who has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Third, together with the convention, a global international agency was created to oversee its implementation. Both the convention and the mandate of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refer explicitly to the obligation of countries to provide statistical data. Clearly, the drafters of the convention realized that statistics from governments were a key element in protecting and assisting refugees.

Fourth, refugees form a special group of people crossing international borders. While countries have the sovereign right to determine which foreigner has the right to enter and stay, refugees are an exception. States are obliged to admit refugees as long as they are in need of protection. This unique right ensures that refugees are carefully screened, registered, documented, and thus... counted.

Continuous Data Collection

The means to implement the laws are as important as the laws themselves. With more than 4,000 staff in 120 countries, the UNHCR is in daily contact with refugees, governments of host countries, and countries of origin. The office works with over 500 partners to implement refugee programs. Its global presence and infrastructure ensure a continuous gathering of information on refugees, including numbers and profiles. Obviously, it is much easier to collect data through the intermediary of UNHCR country offices than to wait for national bureaucracies to respond to a questionnaire from a faraway international body. Being "refugee professionals," UNHCR officials are not simply experts in collecting information. They also provide, through their daily contact with officials, training on standards, including the ways to count and record refugees.

Challenges

In order to count properly, you need very strong motivations. In the case of asylum seekers and refugees, providing protection and rendering assistance appear to be very good ones. However, although asylum and refugee statistics are widely and increasingly available, they are not free from problems. There are four main weak points:

First, the very fact that the amount of data is rapidly growing has implications for their comparability. In Germany, for instance, the number of data elements reported by asylum authorities grew from five at a point 10 years ago to 21 today. Such increases in detail make it harder to compare country experiences as long as the data are based on national asylum law. Indeed, the growing complexity of asylum statistics reported by industrialized countries poses a challenge to analyzing international trends. Areas in which the asylum data have become increasingly complex include appeals processes; persons allowed to remain for reasons other than convention grounds; reasons for formally rejecting claims; and processes for not admitting claims to the asylum procedure. Clearly, an important factor in the rapid increase in availability of refugee and asylum data is technology, which allows for a much more efficient sharing of data from administrative systems.

Second, the *New York Times* article made specific reference to the tendency on the part of officials to inflate or obscure migration trends. This danger is relatively strong in the area of asylum and refugees. The UNHCR data are

widely used by officials and the media to defend or criticize positions and policies. Yet, statisticians do not have much say in the use of "their" data beyond the presentation and basic analysis they provide. Indeed, the statistical goals of objectivity and transparency allow users to draw their own conclusions. Providing data in an impartial and balanced manner is the best data producers can do. It is up to analysts to make good use of the data.

Third, although the UN refugee convention spells out the definition of a refugee, its interpretation may be subject to debate. Whereas the objective factors causing a refugee to flee are relatively easy to document (for example, war, persecution of a particular ethnic group, etc.), individual motives are more subject to interpretation. Moreover, refugee definitions may change over time: groups considered refugees one year may be dropped from the national statistics the next, and vice versa. UNHCR statistics generally reflect the government's position, which may sometimes differ from the interpretation of non-governmental organizations. In short, defining who is a refugee may not be as easy as it appears.

Fourth, data coverage is uneven and depends on the purpose and method of data collection. As a general rule, refugees benefit from being counted because it increases their access to safety and services. This is evident in refugee camps, where official registration data often overestimate the size of the resident population: it is easier to register than to de-register people. The opposite is true for those refugees who are not dependent on international assistance or whose stay is relatively safe. These refugees tend to be underreported by international agencies.

Counting IDPs

Internally displaced persons (IDPs), although they are by definition not international migrants, merit some consideration here because they move for the same reasons as refugees. However, while their reasons for displacement may be similar, UNHCR's experience shows a great gap in data quality between refugees and internally displaced. IDP estimates are often very rough, and they tend to differ greatly in terms of the source (governments, international agencies, non-governmental organizations).

What are the main reasons for this gap in data quality? First, the internally displaced do not benefit from the same level of international protection and assistance as refugees. There is no specific international convention protecting IDPs. Also, there is no single international body entrusted with their protection and assistance. Second, IDP movements typically involve short distances, and often, short time frames. Third, as in the case of voluntary migratory patterns, internal movements are much less recorded than international movements. The inherent interest of a receiving country in who is entering is absent in the case of internal movements, which are free of restrictions and subject to fewer administrative hurdles. Fourth, considering that they are still living in the country where they have been persecuted, the internally displaced may be less willing to register than those who enjoy the protection of their asylum country.

This article was contributed by Bela Hovy, Head, Population Data Unit, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva. The views and opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugee.

Human Trafficking: The Need for Better Data

By Frank Laczko

November 1, 2002

Human trafficking involves controlling and exploiting people after transporting them to a new location, often beyond the borders of their homeland. In this modern form of slavery, traffickers use threats, intimidation, and violence to break their victims' will and resistance.

This trafficking in humans has become a global business, reaping huge profits for traffickers and organized crime syndicates, generating massive human rights violations, and causing serious problems for governments. Despite the magnitude of the problem, however, it has only recently seized policy makers' attention. As recently as 10 years ago, the expression "human trafficking" rarely appeared in migration policy debates. Today, however, trafficking is one of the major concerns of both governments and organizations active in the migration field, and has become a priority for those working in many other policy areas such as human rights, health, law enforcement, and social services.

There is still very limited information on the scale of trafficking, how it works, and the most effective means to halt it. One of the biggest knowledge gaps lies in the area of data collection. Despite the growing literature on trafficking, relatively few studies are based on extensive research, and information on the actual numbers of people trafficked remains very sketchy.

"Few governments systematically collect trafficking data."

Policy makers and analysts are now asking what can and should be done to improve information on trafficking. A key part of this investigation involves understanding why gathering reliable data has proven so difficult.

Re-defining Trafficking

Perhaps the most basic step toward collecting sound data has been simply to define "trafficking." As researchers and policy makers from diverse countries and international bodies have tried to harmonize their approaches to trafficking, a common definition has proved vital.

In fact, the international definition of trafficking as a distinct phenomenon has emerged only in recent years. Until the mid-1990s, trafficking was often viewed as a form of human smuggling and a type of illegal migration. A clear and distinct global definition of trafficking has only been available since the December 2000 signing of the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, which lays out the following:

"Trafficking in persons' shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation."

"Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs."

The protocol further says that anyone subjected to the kinds of coercion and manipulation laid out in the definition cannot "consent" to being exploited — thus eliminating the legal grounds for traffickers to defend themselves by claiming they had willing victims.

Smuggling vs. Trafficking

One obstacle to creating a workable international definition of trafficking is the fact that various crimes — especially people smuggling — tend to overlap. For this reason, the UN protocol draws a key distinction between "trafficking" and "smuggling," defining the latter as the "procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident."

The definition is intended to distinguish smugglers, whose main occupation is transporting migrants via illegal

channels, from traffickers, who combine transportation with exploitation. Categorizing these crimes can be difficult, however, and some commentators argue that creating a workable distinction between smuggling and trafficking is impossible. They point out that many "smuggled" migrants are exposed to abuse and exploitation either while being transported or on arrival, confounding attempts to paint neat lines between smuggling and trafficking.

Other commentators believe, however, that applying sharper definitions is key to gathering accurate data. Without drawing such distinctions, they argue, the data will not support the research needed to understand current trends and create policies that deter and penalize traffickers while protecting victims.

Magnitude and Meanings

Before proceeding into the complexities of gathering data, it is important to note the scale of global trafficking — or rather, to acknowledge the sheer immensity of a phenomenon that has so far mocked efforts at large-scale quantitative analysis.

Given the fairly recent acceptance of the new international definitions of trafficking and smuggling, it is perhaps unsurprising that few governments systematically collect trafficking data. In fact, many countries mix data related to trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration, meaning that figures are often little more than estimates. Furthermore, the available data usually concern the trafficking of women and children for sexual exploitation. All of this makes understanding the magnitude of trafficking a tricky business.

"An estimated 120,000 women and children are trafficked into Western Europe each year"

At the global level, the most widely quoted figure concerns the number of women and children believed to be trafficked worldwide each year across international borders. In 1997, US authorities estimated that 700,000 to two million women and children were being trafficked in this way each year. No explanation has been given as to the assumptions underlying such estimates. Moreover, such numbers are widely regarded as very conservative because they do not include trafficking within countries, nor do they take into account the trafficking of men.

Narrowing it down to a more regional perspective, in March 2001, the European Commission reported that "an estimated 120,000 women and children are being trafficked into Western Europe each year." Again, it is unclear how these figures were reached. In a 2000 report on trafficking in EU member states, Europol, the EU's law enforcement agency, comments that while the overall number of victims trafficked in the EU is still unknown and only estimates are available, "What is clear is the fact that the number of victims is much higher than the official statistics from investigated cases in Member States."

At the national level, a 1998 study of 25 European countries by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), an international body working with migrants and governments to provide humane responses to migration challenges, found that only 12 could produce data on cases of trafficking in women, and only seven on cases of trafficking in children. Eleven countries were able to supply data on the number of convictions for offences related to trafficking in women, with the combined total of convictions in 1996 standing at less than 100. Recent IOM studies in other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, South Korea, and Russia have produced similar results.

IOM, for example, collects both qualitative and quantitative information on trafficking based on the numbers of trafficked people it assists. IOM's trafficking database includes information on the number of victims assisted, their country of origin, age, travel route, and the manner in which they were trafficked. In 2001, IOM provided assistance to 1,324 victims of trafficking, and in 2002 the figure is expected to rise to 2,200.

When examined in detail, the IOM data point to new trends. For instance, they show clearly that there is considerable trafficking within Central and Eastern Europe, and not only between the East and West. In 2001, the majority of trafficking victims assisted by IOM came from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. In the majority of cases, the women had been trafficked to countries and provinces in the Balkans, especially Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. IOM data also indicate that trafficking is occurring between Central and Eastern Europe and Asia. For example, in 2000 IOM assisted Romanian and Moldovan women who had been trafficked to Cambodia.

In the countries of origin of trafficking victims in the developing world, it is more difficult to obtain data. Nevertheless, there are many indications of a growing problem. For example, in February 2000, Nigeria, the most populous country in Africa, hosted the first pan-African conference on human trafficking. The conference was opened by Nigeria's President Olusegun Obasanjo, who reported that 1,178 Nigerian women and children believed to be victims of trafficking were deported from states abroad and returned to their homeland between March 1999 and December 2000.

Although most trafficking data refer to women and girls, there are reports of boys being trafficked. For example, over the last 10 years nearly 2,000 boys have reportedly been trafficked from Bangladesh to the Persian Gulf states to work as camel jockeys, since they are the lightest possible riders for races.

Why So Little Sound Data?

Besides the scale of trafficking, there are many other reasons for the scarcity of data. Among the most important are the victims' frequent reluctance to report crimes or testify for fear of reprisals; disincentives, both structural and legal, for law enforcement officers to act against traffickers; a lack of harmony among existing data sources; and the unwillingness of some countries and agencies to share data.

It is likely that the majority of trafficking cases remain unreported because the victims fear retaliation by the traffickers, who are often affiliated with organized crime syndicates. In addition, they may fear government penalties because of their status as undocumented migrants. Those brave enough to testify against traffickers may simply find themselves deported. The combined affect of these fears is to quiet the victims, lower the number of reported cases, and limit the data available to researchers.

Lack of data can also be attributed to the low priority placed on fighting trafficking by law enforcement officers, who face two major disincentives. First, legislation for prosecution and victim protection is often lacking, inadequate, or not implemented, making the conviction of traffickers very difficult and often impossible. Second, trafficking convictions are often, though not always, based on witness/victim testimony that may not materialize if the victims are likely to be deported. The net result is that the police often prefer not to go after traffickers at all, knowing that a great deal of effort only rarely results in a conviction.

Workplace issues among law enforcement agencies may also contribute to the lack of data collection. One study of police practices in Germany, one of the few countries to publish annual statistics on the magnitude of trafficking, found a decline in the number of people trafficked between 1994 and 2000. However, researchers attributed the perceived decline to a lower number of victims registered, partly resulting from fewer police investigations due to:

- Understaffing of police units concerned with trafficking offences
- Shifting of focus to associated criminal elements that can be tackled more easily
- Assignment of police concerned with trafficking to a wide range of duties, making it almost impossible for them to detect and prosecute trafficking offences
- Execution of a significant proportion of large-scale investigations by organized crime units rather than trafficking units

Whether caused by weak legal frameworks, reluctant witnesses, or internal police issues, the end result of hobbled investigations and prosecution of traffickers is less access to sound data.

Data Discrepancies

Despite the lack of data from law enforcement sources, other new sources of data are emerging as more agencies around the world take action to combat trafficking. The US government alone reported that in 2001 it supported over 110 anti-trafficking programs in around 50 countries. In Europe there are numerous agencies implementing programs to fight trafficking. However, no single agency acts as a focal point for the collection, collation, or harmonization of statistics on trafficking either at national level or at a regional level, presenting policy makers with a significant degree of uncertainty.

Moreover, it is often the case that existing data are program-specific. They are frequently based on the varying definitions used by each individual agency. They may also only cover those receiving certain types of assistance, e.g., persons participating in voluntary assisted return programmes, or those accommodated in shelters for victims of trafficking. Each agency gathers data according to its own needs, and the same individual may appear in data produced by more than one organization.

Data also varies according to the resources of the organizations concerned. Some are better financed and accord greater priority to data collection than others. Some NGOs register first contacts with victims, others monitor hotline calls or those eligible for temporary residence permits. Some agencies compile data over a one-year period, while others produce statistics covering the duration of a specific project.

Hoarding Data

Another problem is that at the international level, the sharing of information on trafficking tends to occur on an ad hoc basis, especially between countries of origin and destination. This is true for both governments and international agencies.

The reasons for this reticence are varied. Some countries regard data on human trafficking as classified information, and therefore do not share it. Other states have data protection laws prohibiting the dissemination of personal information, while some ministries simply adopt a policy of restricted distribution. Authorities in destination countries may be reluctant to share information with source countries whose authorities and law enforcement agencies are suspected of involvement in trafficking.

Some agencies, for their part, are reluctant to release data simply because of concerns about its quality. NGOs may be reluctant to share data for other reasons, e.g., to protect the confidentiality of the trafficked persons they assist.

Confronting the Data Shortage

Although the array of obstacles to collecting accurate data on trafficking is daunting, significant work is underway to sidestep or eliminate such problems. The effort is likely to gather strength from two sources: an overall increase in government and multilateral efforts to combat trafficking, and more deliberate institutional strategies to systematically deal with trafficking data.

The growing political importance of the battle against trafficking was exemplified by the largest-ever European Union conference on "Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human Beings," which was held in Brussels in September 2002. The event, organized by IOM on behalf of the EU, brought together over 1,000 representatives of European institutions, EU member countries, states applying for EU membership, and relevant third countries. The delegates were drawn from governments, international institutions, and nongovernmental organizations. The conference produced the "Brussels Declaration," which outlined a set of policy recommendations to the EU on trafficking.

In the United States, too, trafficking has been rising on the political agenda. In October 2001, the State Department created the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and in June 2002 the department published its second report assessing the efforts of 89 countries to fight trafficking. This report is the most comprehensive anti-trafficking review to be issued by any single government.

This greater focus on trafficking is likely to help fill the knowledge gap in various ways, whether through better data collection and dissemination by individual governments' programs, or by cross-border, inter-agency coordination that fosters better data sharing and analysis.

Besides the overall efforts to boost the anti-trafficking fight, there are more deliberate efforts to systematize the collection of data. In this vein, the United Nations Population Division organized an inter-agency meeting in July 2002 to discuss ways in which data on international migration could be improved and made more widely available. The conveners emphasized that scarce and unreliable data had made systematic coordination among data collectors and analysts a top priority.

The need for better coordination of existing data is particularly applicable in the case of information on human trafficking. As the number of counter-trafficking programs increases, an increasing amount of statistical data on trafficking is becoming available from a variety of sources, and it is likely that such data will improve as more NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, and others step up their efforts to combat trafficking.

However, a mechanism to coordinate and standardize these disparate data collection systems and various indicators of trafficking is still lacking. Much more will have to be done in order to improve the comparability of the limited amount of statistical data currently available from a wide variety of agencies.

An example of what may be possible to achieve is the establishment this year of a "regional clearing point" in Belgrade for the Balkans. This project, which was established within the framework of the Balkans Stability Pact Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings in July 2002, aims to create a regional database on trafficking. By collecting and analyzing information gained from a wide range of sources, the project intends to foster a comprehensive understanding of human trafficking throughout the Balkans. This type of project, which is managed under IOM auspices, is to be extended to other regions where IOM implements counter-trafficking programmes.

Another realm exists in which more systematic efforts can be made: Existing sources of information on trafficking, including possible indirect indicators, have yet to be fully exploited. Although there are relatively few statistics relating directly to human trafficking, there may be other indicators that suggest the occurrence of trafficking.

Examples of potentially untapped indirect indicators on trafficking include the number of missing persons. For example, in Lithuania it was recently reported that the number of missing persons had tripled since 1989, in a trend believed to be linked to the growth in trafficking. Another more controversial indicator is the number of migrant women working in the sex industry in a particular country, a possibility highlighted by studies on prostitution in Europe. As Europol points out, "[N]ot all foreign prostitutes are victims of trafficking, but a sizeable

proportion is probably exploited to some degree." This kind of statistic may be relevant, therefore, in discussions about the likely extent of trafficking.

Looking to the future, commentators are also pointing to the need for more research on good data collection and analysis policies. Researchers will be attempting to answer the question of why Germany, for example, has been able to publish statistics on trafficking since 1994, a feat accomplished by few other industrialized countries.

Another strategy still waiting in the wings is that of supporting poor countries' data collection efforts - one of the key recommendations to emerge from the UN Population Division's 2002 inter-agency conference. Participants in the event highlighted the need for international organizations and governments to provide greater technical and financial assistance to developing countries in order to enable them to collect better migration data.

In the long run, superior data will only emerge when the gravity of trafficking is fully recognized and acknowledged by all authorities concerned. Unless governments and law enforcement agencies are prepared to combat trafficking more vigorously and, at the same time, to provide adequate protection to the victims of trafficking, the majority of trafficking cases will continue to go uncounted, the victims uncared for, and the traffickers unpunished. Going forward, it all depends on sound policies based on good data.

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The New Immigrant Survey in the US: The Experience over Time

By Guillermina Jasso, Douglas S. Massey,
Mark R. Rosenzweig, and James P. Smith

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Immigration affects American society in profound ways. Yet in perhaps no other area of social science and public policy research has there been as large a gap between information needs and existing data. Consequently, many fundamental questions remain unanswered. These include the following: How does the health and well-being of immigrants compare to that of the native born? How many immigrants return to their home country? What is the relationship between legal and illegal immigration? What are the contributions and costs of immigrants to the economy? What are the factors affecting the assimilation of immigrants and their children? What are the achievements of, and burdens imposed by, immigrant children and the children of immigrants?

Embedded in immigration questions are further questions that run the gamut of human experience, from processes of language acquisition to identity formation, to achievement of excellence and development of civic virtue.

The New Immigrant Survey is a new plan for nationally representative, longitudinal studies of immigrants and their children that promises to provide new kinds of data that will help answer many of the important questions about immigration and concomitantly shed light on basic aspects of human development. An early pilot already shows promising results.

Lawful Permanent Residents in the United States

Lawful permanent residents are foreign-born persons who have been granted the right to live permanently in the United States. Such immigrants may obtain legal permanent residence in the US by qualifying for a family-sponsored or employment-based immigrant visa or by adjusting from temporary refugee and asylee visas. Permanent residence may also be acquired through the diversity visa lottery program, which allots additional immigration visas to countries that are strongly underrepresented in US immigration streams.

A New Plan for Better Immigration Data

For over 20 years, successive panels assembled in both the public and private sectors -- e.g., panels of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Institutes of Health, the Rockefeller Foundation -- have agreed on the best option for remedying the immigration-data situation in order to substantially advance understanding of the socioeconomic status of immigrants and their children and the effects of immigration in the United States. The New Immigrant Survey (NIS) addresses this challenge by using the administrative records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to draw large samples from new cohorts of lawful permanent residents (LPRs -- see box above). Roughly 11,000 immigrants will be interviewed immediately after admission to permanent residence status and re-interviewed periodically thereafter; information will also be obtained about and from their spouses as well as their children, both the immigrant children they bring with them and the US citizen children born to them in the United States.

NIS Content. NIS survey instruments will obtain information on a variety of topics, including health, schooling, marriage and family, skills, languages and English language skills, labor force participation, earnings, use of government services, networks, travel, and religion. In successive rounds, the instruments will track changes over time. Importantly, the NIS design will allow for comparability with other major US longitudinal surveys, such as the National Longitudinal Surveys and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, thus facilitating comparisons of immigrants and the native born. Special attention will be paid to immigrant children and the children of immigrants, including assessment of their academic abilities, skills, and achievements. As well, the instruments will seek immigrants' ideas about the migration process, including assessment of the helpfulness of various sources of information.

NIS Interview Language. A basic principle of the New Immigrant Survey is that every respondent is interviewed in the language of his or her choice; this could be English or any of the world's languages. Using immigrants' preferred languages increases response rate and data quality but also requires substantial resources for instrument translation and bilingual interviewers.

NIS Pilot. Because the NIS design, with its rather complex sampling, geographic, and language elements, had never been tried before, a pilot -- the NIS-P -- was carried out in 1996, with support from the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the National Science Foundation (NSF). The

pilot confirmed the soundness of the design, highlighted the importance of contacting sampled immigrants immediately after admission to permanent residence, and provided new information on immigrants never before available (discussed below).

First NIS Cohort

First NIS Cohort -- NIS 2003 Cohort. The first NIS cohort, not counting the pilot cohort, will be surveyed in 2003. The design calls for selection of two samples: (1) an Adult Sample consisting of 10,000 immigrants newly admitted to legal permanent residence, oversampling employment-based and diversity immigrants and undersampling spouses of US citizens, and (2) a Child Sample consisting of 1,000 children in two categories which would not be found in the households of immigrants in the Adult Sample, namely, minor children of US citizens and adopted orphans.

Languages in the NIS 2003 Cohort. Languages for the NIS 2003 cohort are based on the anticipated origin-country distribution along with language results from the pilot. The survey instruments will be available in English, Spanish, Chinese, Korean, Polish, Russian, Tagalog, and Vietnamese. In addition, key concepts will be translated into seven additional languages: Arabic, Farsi, French, Gujarati, Hindi/Urdu, Serbo-Croatian, and Ukrainian. Bilingual interviewers and/or interpreters will be used for all non-English languages preferred by respondents.

Future Survey Rounds for the NIS 2003 Cohort. Plans call for periodic re-interviews, initially every year, of sampled immigrants and their children, eventually including spin-off households as the children grow up and start families of their own.

Some Findings from the NIS-Pilot FY 1996 Cohort Sample

Schooling of New Legal Immigrants. New legal immigrants, with average schooling of 12.7 years, are as well schooled as the native-born and better schooled by one year than the larger set of foreign born surveyed in the Census and CPS. The schooling distribution among new legal immigrants, however, differs from that among the native-born in that it shows concentrations among both the very highly educated as well as those with few years of schooling. At the higher end, the proportion with at least 17 years of schooling is 21 percent, exceeding substantially that among the native born, 7.7 percent. At the other extreme, the proportion with less than nine years of schooling is 20 percent among the NIS-P immigrants and only six percent among the native born.

Skill Transferability. Early analyses indicate that not all of an immigrant's skills are immediately transferable. This transferability varies by personal characteristics and increases with time in the United States. Thus, accurate assessment of a new immigrant cohort's skills requires longitudinal observation.

Preferred Language. Although less than 20 percent of the NIS-P immigrants came from a country whose official or dominant language is English, over 40 percent preferred to be interviewed in English at the baseline round. Another 31 percent preferred Spanish, and eight percent preferred Russian. Other languages preferred by NIS-P immigrants were, in order of frequency (adjusted for over/undersampling): Chinese, Vietnamese, Polish, French, Tagalog, Korean, Thai, Arabic, Gujarati, Romanian, Albanian, Bengali, Farsi, Ibo, Italian, and Portuguese. In 58 of the 111 countries represented in the NIS-P, all the immigrants preferred English, and in 22 countries all the immigrants preferred a non-English language.

Language Investment. Immigrants are investing individuals, and this trait is reflected in their knowledge of languages. While as children only slightly less than 10 percent spoke more than one language, by the time of admission to legal permanent residence, 72 percent spoke more than one language. Among the monolingual children, 12 percent spoke English, and among these children, 22 percent learned another language. Among the non-English monolingual children, 73 percent learned (at least some) English and another 3.5 percent learned another language or languages.

Use of English. There is substantial use of English among the NIS-P immigrants, with 78 percent reporting that they use English either at home or outside the home. However, only 48 percent use English both in the home and outside the home, and the proportion who speak only English either at home or outside the home is 34 percent.

Religious Preference. Approximately two-thirds of the NIS-P immigrants are Christian, substantially below the 82 percent of the native born surveyed in the General Social Survey of 1996. However, the proportion Catholic is 42 percent, almost twice as large as among the native born (22 percent). The proportion reporting themselves outside the Judeo-Christian fold is over four times larger among recent immigrants than among the native born (17 versus four percent); eight percent of the new immigrants are Muslim. And as would be expected in a country whose principles include not only the freedom to practice any religion but also the freedom to practice no religion, 15 percent of the new immigrants report no religion, a larger fraction than among the native born (12 percent).

Smoking. It is well known that there is less smoking in the United States than in many other countries around the world and that smoking in the US has declined steadily from rates of 57 percent and 28 percent, among men and

women, respectively, in 1955, to rates of 26 and 21 percent, respectively, in 2000. How about immigrants to the United States? How much do they smoke? Among the NIS-P immigrants, 25 percent of the men smoke, down from 53 percent who report ever smoking, and only seven percent of the women smoke, down from 20 percent who report ever smoking. Thus, immigrant men smoke slightly less than US men and immigrant women substantially less than US women. Immigrant men have achieved convergence with US men by dint of quitting; immigrant women have diverged from US women by drastically quitting. These patterns suggest that immigrants, especially immigrant women, may be becoming even more "American" than the native born.

Afterword. It is important to remember that the foregoing results are from an early point in the immigrant career. The patterns revealed in the NIS pilot study may change over the life course, indeed, may change fairly rapidly. Only longitudinal research can tell whether these patterns will last, intensify, attenuate, or reverse. Meanwhile, other cohorts may exhibit different patterns and different trajectories over the life course. The multi-cohort, longitudinal design of the New Immigrant Survey promises to illuminate the immigrant experience.

The principal investigators of the New Immigrant Survey are Guillermina Jasso (New York University), Douglas S. Massey (University of Pennsylvania), Mark R. Rosenzweig (Harvard University), and James P. Smith (RAND). Support for the New Immigrant Survey and the New Immigrant Survey Pilot has been provided by the National Institutes of Health, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the National Science Foundation, the Department of Education, and PEW Charitable Trusts. For further information, please see the NIS.

The Global Dimensions of Female Migration

By Hania Zlotnik

March 1, 2003

Until the late 1970s, most writings on international migration either focused explicitly only on male migrants (usually conceived of as workers) or seemed to assume implicitly that most migrants were male. That assumption was particularly prevalent when attention was focused on the economic aspects of international migration, because it was widely believed that the participation of women in international labor migration was negligible.

Of course, such beliefs were rarely based on statistical evidence since, both then and now, data on international migrants often were not classified by sex. Consequently, when scholars began to call attention to the participation of women in international migration, one of their tasks was to refute those beliefs.

Until recently, a comprehensive set of global estimates permitting an assessment of the extent of female migration was not available. The first such set, containing estimates for the period 1965-1990, was released by the United Nations Population Division in 1998. Estimates at the country level were derived from the number of foreign-born persons enumerated by population censuses, complemented by information on the number of refugees. In 2002, the UN extended estimates of the overall number of migrants (both sexes combined) to 2000, setting the stage for a similar extension of the estimates by sex. As a result, it is now possible to trace the evolution of the number of female migrants from 1960 to 2000.

New Revelations

The main revelation of the new set of global estimates by sex is that women and girls have accounted for a very high proportion of all international migrants for a long time. Already in 1960, female migrants accounted for nearly 47 out of every 100 migrants living outside of their countries of birth. (See Table 1) Since then, the share of female migrants among all international migrants has been rising steadily, to reach 48 percent in 1990 and nearly 49 percent in 2000. Although this trend is consistent with an increasing 'feminization' of international migration, the increase recorded is small compared to the high level of feminization that already existed in 1960.

Table 1. Percentage of female migrants among the total number of international migrants, by major area, 1960-2000

Major area	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000
World	46.6	47.2	47.4	47.9	48.8
More developed regions	47.9	48.2	49.4	50.8	50.9
Less developed regions	45.7	46.3	45.5	44.7	45.7
Europe	48.5	48.0	48.5	51.7	52.4
Northern America	49.8	51.1	52.6	51.0	51.0
Oceania	44.4	46.5	47.9	49.1	50.5
Northern Africa	49.5	47.7	45.8	44.9	42.8
Sub-Saharan Africa	40.6	42.1	43.8	46.0	47.2
Southern Asia	46.3	46.9	45.9	44.4	44.4
Eastern and South-eastern Asia	46.1	47.6	47.0	48.5	50.1
Western Asia	45.2	46.6	47.2	47.9	48.3
Caribbean	45.3	46.1	46.5	47.7	48.9
Latin America	44.7	46.9	48.4	50.2	50.5

For more than 40 years, female migrants have been almost as numerous as male migrants. In 1960 there were 35 million female migrants and 40 million male migrants; by 2000, although the total number of migrants had more than doubled, the gap between females and males remained about the same, 85 million female migrants versus 90 million male migrants.

Female Migrants Claim Larger Proportion in Developed Countries

Female migrants have generally accounted for a larger fraction of the migrant stock in developed countries than in the developing world. In 1960, 48 percent of all migrants in developed countries were women or girls, whereas the equivalent proportion in developing countries was 46 percent.

By 2000 the difference between the two had risen further, since female migrants constituted nearly 51 percent of all migrants in the developed world and still accounted for about 46 percent of all international migrants in developing countries. The cause of these differences should be sought in the laws and regulations governing the admission of migrants in countries of destination and those governing their departure from countries of origin, in conjunction with the interplay of factors determining the status of women in countries of origin and countries of destination.

By permitting the family reunification of legally admitted migrants, developed countries facilitate the admission of migrant women. In addition, the social and economic situation of women in developed countries, where women have access to a variety of educational and employment opportunities, acts as a magnet for women wishing to be economic and social actors in their own right.

Developing Countries See Increase in Female Migration

In contrast, in the developing world, countries that are major receivers of international migrants generally admit them exclusively for labor purposes, and male migrants tend to predominate in labor migration flows. However, since the late 1970s, the participation of women in labor migration flows directed to developing countries has been increasing.

The major magnets for female labor migration are located in Western Asia among the oil-rich countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and in the countries of the Pacific Rim in Eastern and Southeastern Asia. In both of those regions, the proportion of women among all international migrants has been rising steadily since 1980. By 2000, the number of female migrants was estimated to have surpassed the number of male migrants in Eastern and Southeastern Asia (5 million versus 4.9 million). The 7.6 million female migrants in Western Asia were estimated to constitute 48 percent of all migrants in that region.

It bears stressing that not all the female migrants in those regions are migrant workers. In the oil-producing countries of Western Asia, for instance, already by 1975 (before female contract migration became a major component of their migration flows) the number of female migrants was significant, amounting to 43 percent of the foreign population in Kuwait, 33 percent of that in Saudi Arabia, about 30 percent of that in Bahrain, and 20 percent of all foreign migrants in the United Arab Emirates. Most of those female migrants were probably admitted as dependents of male migrant workers, although some may have been hired as teachers or nurses, or to work in other occupations reserved for women.

Proportion of Women Migrants Parallels Refugee Increases in Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of female migrants rose in parallel with the increasing numbers of refugees in the continent. In the early 1990s, when attention began to focus on the plight of female refugees, those involved in advocacy popularized the notion that 80 percent of all refugees were women and children. Because data on refugees classified by age and sex were not available, that estimate seemed plausible for the high-fertility countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, where women and children accounted for high proportions of the total population. (See article by Bela Hovy)

When the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began in the late 1990s to publish data on refugees classified by sex, female refugees in Africa turned out to account for about half of all assisted refugees, implying that they were not over-represented among the refugee population in the continent. In fact, in 2000, women and girls accounted for 47 percent of all migrants in Sub-Saharan Africa, a figure only slightly below the world average, and still indicating that men outnumbered women among migrants in the continent.

Regional Differences in the Migration of Women

Female migrants have been particularly under-represented among all migrants in Northern Africa and Southern Asia. In both regions, the proportion of female migrants has declined since 1970, partly because those regions have few magnets for international migrants. Most countries of Northern Africa are sources of emigrants rather than receivers. In Southern Asia, forced migration has led to very sizable flows within the region, but data on the sex composition of the migrant stock are scarce. Consequently, the estimated levels presented here may not accurately reflect the changes taking place in the share of female migration in the region.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, data on the stock of international migrants is abundant and the trend toward

the increasing feminization of international migration is well established. It is particularly noteworthy that Latin America was the first region of the developing world to record parity in the number of female and male migrants: in 1990, three million of the region's six million international migrants were women. The number of migrants in the region is estimated to have declined during the 1990s, but by 2000 women still constituted slightly more than half of the five million migrants in the region.

Among the developed regions, Northern America, which includes Canada and the United States, is exceptional in that female migrants have outnumbered male migrants since 1970, but the female numerical advantage declined somewhat during the 1980s, largely as a result of the high levels of undocumented migration converging on the United States. As the regularization program carried out under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 revealed, women constituted a somewhat low proportion of all those regularized (34 percent). However, women have tended to outnumber men among all legally admitted immigrants.

Both Europe and Oceania have displayed an increasing proportion of female migrants since 1970. In Oceania, female migrants constituted slightly more than half of all migrants present in the region in 2000 (2.9 million out of 5.8 million). In Europe, female migrants became more numerous than male migrants were earlier. By 1990, nearly 52 percent of all migrants in Europe were women or girls (25 million out of 48 million).

These estimates, however, are dependent on the assumptions made about the percentage of women among the persons who became international migrants at the time of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, because the estimates for 1990 already reflect the effects of that disintegration. Lacking data on the sex distribution of migrants in the successor states of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that Soviet migrants had the same composition by sex as the average of other European countries. As a result, Europe becomes the region where female migrants outnumbered male migrants by the widest margin in 2000. At that time, female migrants constituted 52 percent of the 56 million migrants in Europe.

Conclusion

In sum, the data amply demonstrate that globally, the number of female migrants has been large and increasing, both in terms of the sheer number of women involved and in terms of their share of the world's migrant stock. The majority of female migrants, like the majority of all migrants, are currently living in developed countries, particularly in Europe (29 million) and Northern America (20 million). In those countries, women often outnumber men among international migrants. In the developing world, the 32 million female migrants present in 2000 were still outnumbered by their male counterparts, but not by much. Clearly, female migration is a key constituent of global migration.

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Building a Gender and Age-Sensitive Approach to Refugee Protection

By Bela Hovy

March 1, 2003

Together, women and children constitute almost 70 percent of those under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) today. Raising public and programmatic awareness of the special needs of women and children has been critical to ensuring that resources and responses have been appropriately deployed. In fact, women's advocates have systematically raised this issue in humanitarian circles for more than two decades. There is more work to do, however, to guarantee not only that services continue but also that they are tailored to meet the diverse needs of individual refugees in various refugee settings.

For a variety of reasons, women and girls are facing special risks. In broad terms, women are often responsible for shouldering a great deal of the responsibility for their family's continued survival, a burden that is heavier for refugee women. Beyond this, sexual abuse and gender-based violence, including domestic violence, are continuing concerns. Still another concern has been access to quality healthcare, including reproductive health care that acknowledges the risk of HIV/AIDs and other sexually transmitted diseases. For girls, too, lack of education can further exacerbate these other forms of vulnerability.

Yet, at a certain point, understanding that women and children compose the majority of refugees may obscure the finer diversity of experience in individual refugee settings. Indeed, women and children, like men and children, necessarily make up the majority of any population since, as a demographic fact, women make up roughly 50 percent of any normal population. Having now successfully drawn attention to this simple but critical fact for women and children's services, refugee advocates, international agencies, and others concerned with refugee well-being must face the next big hurdle: understanding more precisely the special characteristics of individual situations.

Untangling Statistics and Individualizing Services

Improvements in the collection of data have helped pave the way for more focused refugee relief programs. Over the past decade, the UNHCR has increasingly collected statistics on refugees through individual registration and population surveys. Refugee profiles by sex and age are currently available for some 120 asylum countries covering almost two-thirds of the 12 million refugees worldwide under UNHCR's care. In countries with UNHCR assistance operations, statistics by sex and age are available for 75 percent of the population, most of whom are living in camps. Based on this data, in 2002, UNHCR estimated that 48 percent of the population under its mandate were women aged 18 and up. Some 45 percent of them were refugee children under 18, roughly half of them female.

In 90 percent of the larger refugee camps—the primary focus of humanitarian aid—the proportion of women varies between 45 and 55 percent. The percentage of children ranges from less than a quarter in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans to more than half in most of Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. In short, while most refugees are indeed women and children, the distribution by sex and age differs significantly between regions, countries and refugee scenarios. And, in these contexts, men and boys of various ages may also need more tailored assistance, depending on the situation.

Toward A Gender and Age-Sensitive Approach

There is a careful balance to be struck. On the one hand, the special needs of women and girls in refugee settings should be addressed. On the other hand, programs must also recognize their skills, contributions, and roles as caregivers and agents of change. Thus, in recent years, provision of assistance has become much more tailored to special categories. These include single women, female-headed households, women with disabilities, older refugees, and adolescent girls. The challenge is to integrate our gender awareness into an understanding of whether individual refugees—men or women—are in a situation that requires specific protection or assistance measures. The more rigorous data collection we have on age, health, education, special needs, and other social and demographic characteristics, the more effective programming can be.

For example, recent humanitarian interventions in regions with aging populations have brought the plight of aging displaced people to the forefront. In some countries in the Balkans and the former Soviet Union, older displaced persons outnumber children. Moreover, women are overrepresented in these areas as a result of their longer life expectancy. In general, population aging and the longer life expectancy of women will have a significant impact on the changing composition of future refugee flows.

Conclusion

Recognizing the needs of women and children has paved the way for individualized assistance programs.

Incorporating age and gender along with other attributes of displaced persons will greatly enhance the type and quality of services provided. Furthermore, allowing refugee women and children to be active participants in program development will further mesh needs and responses. Finally, rigorous data collection on the sex and age of displaced populations will remain essential for program planning and implementation.

Sources

All statistics used in this article are taken from the *Statistical Yearbook 2001: Refugees, Asylum-Seekers and Other Persons of Concern - Trends in Displacement, Protection and Solutions* (UNHCR Geneva, October 2002). See <http://www.unhcr.ch> (Statistics).

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Can UN Migration Recommendations Be Met in Europe?

By Michel Poulain and Nicolas Perrin
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July 1, 2003

Relative to other demographic phenomena, like births and deaths, migration is assuming increasing importance in measurements of population change. Unlike other demographic phenomena, however, migration flows pose particular challenges to the production and measurement of reliable and widely comparable statistics.

Reasons for these challenges can be found both in the characteristics of migration itself and in current strategies for collecting and interpreting migration data. Migration flows, for example, fluctuate rapidly while many demographic patterns change only slowly. International migration is also the only demographic statistic that is currently produced simultaneously by two different national statistical institutes — one in the country of departure and one in the country of arrival. Despite the difficulties, reliable international migration data are urgently needed in the areas of population projections and policies.

UN recommendations on international migration statistics provide a useful target for improving the collection, reliability and comparability of such statistics in Europe. This article explores the current state of European migration statistics and the prospects for greater coordination.

Factors in the Current Unreliability of Migration Statistics

The fluctuation and unreliability of international migration statistics are exacerbated by the use of inappropriate sources of data. Except for specific migration surveys, data sources are not generally put in place with the ultimate aim of counting migrants. As a result, statistical collection of migration data is a by-product of administrative data collection systems. Moreover, countries often do not have the same political, economic, or social interest in collecting data on immigration and emigration. Finally, confusion between "migration" and "migrant" and between migratory "flows" and "stocks" does not improve data collection of migrant flows and stocks.

Data unreliability also stems from policy decisions in the countries involved in a given migration flow. The closure of frontiers and the rise of illegal migration and asylum seekers make the calculation of migration flows more difficult and require differentiation between a country's de facto and de jure populations. It is impossible to estimate precisely the number of illegal immigrants. Beyond this, these estimates cannot be included in administrative data collection that measures *legal* immigration.

At the same time, the increase in the number asylum claims makes the comparison and estimation of flows difficult. Many countries do not consider asylum seekers as migrants when they compile their statistics (for example, Belgium, Netherlands and Germany). In these cases, while claims are pending, asylum seekers are counted as temporary migrants waiting for a long-term stay permit.

In Europe, an increase in migration within the countries of the EU and a decrease in changes to usual countries of residence have made these measurements even more complex. First, it is now easier for EU citizens to live in another European country without asking for a permit to stay. In fact, the reliability of migration statistics concerning European citizens is lower than that for non-EU citizens. Secondly, intra-European migration is often no longer considered as relevant by administrations in charge of migration management. The focus is now often on immigrants from outside the European Union, asylum seekers, and illegal migration. In certain cases, migration statistics are no longer even compiled for European citizens.

The European Model

The Eurostat measurement of flows between Denmark and Germany in 1998 illustrate the difficulty of measuring migration flows. When the registered level of immigration in Germany is compared with the Danish equivalent, it appears that Denmark underestimates immigration flows by 50 percent. In fact, the definitions used in Germany and in Denmark are very different: Germany considers every entry an "immigration" after seven days, while Denmark requires an intended duration of three months. Therefore, very short-term migrations are included in Germany but not in Denmark. This example makes clear that among the challenges of improving the comparability of international migration statistics, harmonizing the concepts and definitions of migration are no less important than resolving the problems of poor reliability of data collection systems.

How is it possible to explain such large differences between statistical figures supposed to measure the same migration flow? First, the national definition of migration often differs from the internationally recommended definition. In addition, the reliability of migration data is sometimes so poor that, even when countries define

migration in the same terms, the resulting figures may differ widely. Lastly, unless all sub-populations are identified, it is not certain that the data cover entirely the populations in question. (For example, asylum seekers, students, seasonal workers and even EU citizens are important types of sub-populations that are often *not* included in migration statistics in Europe.) In sum, the development of comparable migration systems requires both the implementation of reliable data collection systems and the coordination of ideas about and definitions of migration.

Improving Current Systems of Migration Data Collection

In this context, Eurostat, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UN/ECE), and other international bodies are working to improve the overall reliability and comparability of the migration data collection. One means of resolving the difficulties of migration measurement is to look to the UN-recommended definitions of long- and short-term migration as a standard upon which to base measurements. This would do much to improve the reliability and comparability of statistics.

There remain, nevertheless, a number of unique challenges that must be overcome if migration statistics are to be truly reliable. According to the UN *Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration* (revised in 1998), long-term international immigration is recorded after an individual enters a country and establishes his usual place of residence there for one year or more. UN definitions of short-term immigration state that the period of residence is limited to between three months and one year.

Several types of sources are currently used to collect migration data, which are more or less useful to meet the UN recommendations:

- Censuses with questions specific to internal and international mobility;
- Administrative population registers which record individuals' administrative residence as well as their entries and exits in relation to the national territory;
- Entry or exit visas and the collection of statistics at the borders;
- Records that track the granting or renewal of residence permits and management of aliens' registers; and,
- Surveys specific to international mobility and pertaining to representative samples of the population.

Before these data sources can be considered appropriate for the implementation of UN recommendations, however, they must meet several other criteria. Importantly, the data must be reliable and consistent, and the whole population must be covered by the data source, including all sub-populations and all types of migrants. If data collection systems are modified, or if new systems are introduced, there are other factors that must be considered including: the feasibility and cost of the change or introduction; any national rules regarding administrative and statistical systems; and, the national sensibilities regarding migration.

Given these caveats, the census is the least satisfactory option because it only counts new immigrants from the time that the census was taken. Also, long and short-term migrations are not differentiated.

Cross-border counting would theoretically allow for the counting of entries and exits. In this context, UN recommendations could be followed by asking a question at the entry and another at the exit about the expected or real length of stay or by stamping passports to make length of stay apparent. However, these systems are generally unreliable. Not all migrants need a visa (none of the EU citizens traveling within Europe, for example). Moreover, the fact of obtaining a visa or work permit does not mean that the person will use it nor stay until its expiration, which would indicate the duration of the stay.

Other data sources are simply problematic to implement. Updating residence or work permit files, for example, is difficult and specific migration surveys are limited by the sample size.

Population registers, however, record both immigration and emigration, link the entry and exit dates of an individual and clearly record the actual length of stay. Generally speaking, there have also been improvements in population register quality in Western Europe. In Spain, for example, revisions that were made every five years are now permanent. Countries like Belgium and the Nordic states have centralized their registers and have improved links between their diverse administrative files including the population register (as well as social security, property records, employment records, and activity records concerning firms' activities, i.e. the number of employees, types of production, and financial results). This avoids double counting and improves data verification. As computerization has grown, so has the amount of information produced because the capacity for variables and tables has increased and definitions have been refined. It is only through centralization, however, that population registers are reliable, yet even this does not guarantee international compatibility between immigration and emigration figures.

Population Registers in Brief

A population register is a database recording continuously and individually information concerning the population of a given territory. To set it up, a census is organized. Some relevant questions are selected (name, date and place of birth, sex, place of residence, date of marriage, name of the parents, date and place of the parents, profession...) and inscribed in what will become a population register. Afterwards, the database is continuously updated by using registers of births, deaths, and marriage and by organizing a registration of resident population and migration (which distinguish population registers from usual registers of births, deaths and marriage). Population registers exist in most EU countries (exceptions are France, UK, Ireland, Greece, and Portugal) and are widely used in the other European countries. (Legoux, Luc and Nicolas Perrin, 1999)

To remedy this, a removal card system would require a person leaving country A to take a form upon departure that would be given to authorities in country B upon arrival. Later, country B would determine whether it was a long- or short-term migration and inform country A of the determination. This would ensure compatibility between immigration and emigration statistics. The advantages of this process are demonstrated by its successful use in the Nordic countries.

Europe Aims for Greater Comparability, Reliability

As discussed earlier, comparability of international statistics is frequently so low that it hinders correct statistical analysis. In conjunction with overall improvement of data collection, two analytical approaches have been developed to promote comparable and reliable migration data. The first method consists of bilateral co-operations between pairs of country in order to examine the details of differences between data. Eurostat has used this method to link data between Belgium, on one side, and Denmark, Sweden and Italy, on the other side. This research is pioneering insofar as it is the first time that individual data has been linked between two data files produced by two completely different systems in two different countries. Therefore it allows comparison of individual data rather than comparison of aggregate data.

The second method uses a basic mathematical model to correct estimations of intra-European migration. However, this method is not a substitute for coordinating the criteria and collection processes between European countries.

In addition, many countries have made concrete efforts to improve the reliability and comparability of their own national statistics. Governments have sought to improve reliability through a variety of measures:

- Introducing new measurement tools, making new use of existing administrative sources, and improving the reliability of existing sources through stricter rules and automatic verification systems;
- Extending the range of a source so that it includes specific sub-populations;
- Comparing sources within the country so that the global quality of information on migration flows is improved, and cooperating with other countries so that information on migration flows between the two countries is improved;
- Modifying and adapting criteria so that they begin to reflect UN recommendations; and
- Extending the range of existing data and tables to satisfy data collection programs carried out by international statistical institutions.

For a few countries, the gap between the national definition and the international recommended one is relatively small and therefore greater harmonization may be more easily achieved. But in a large number of countries, the data sources and national practices are so different from the internationally recommended definition that harmonization is practically impossible. The objective, therefore, may only be minimal comparability rather than complete harmonization.

UN Recommendations as a Realistic Goal

While there is a growing consciousness of the impact of diverse national definitions, the UN criteria have not been formally adopted anywhere. The Nordic countries, which come the closest in this regard, have systems in place for exchanging migration information, and therefore provide an important example of creating reliable international migration data. They demonstrate that collaboration, either bilateral or within a multinational framework, can produce reliable and comparable data, but its first goal must be to standardize the fundamental concepts and

criteria, the collection methods, and the variables and data collected.

The 1998 UN recommendations represent a common goal for improving international migration statistics. Ideally, all the countries with a system of population registers and active records of changes in the place of residence could, at least in the long term, exchange minimum information on international migrants. The inclusion on all national forms of a common body of questions for declaring a change of residence would further this goal. In addition, data exchange between statistical services or qualified administrations could prove very useful.

Real harmonization, however, will occur only with the development of real political will. Until recently, national interests have taken precedence over the need for internationally comparable statistics. Moreover, the lack of reliability is a significant problem at a national scale. Increasingly, however, international confrontations are bringing to light the significance of data comparability and reliability. In Europe, only focused political energy at a European level will lead to a substantial improvement in the estimation of migration currents. Most importantly, the ultimate objective should not be to record a maximum number of migrants but rather to measure migration in a way that is as near as possible to the UN definition.

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New Estimates of the Undocumented Population in the United States

By Jeffrey Passel

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About 8.5 million undocumented immigrants lived in the United States in 2000, according to the best available evidence from estimates that combine data from Census 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the March 2000 Current Population Survey, the Census 2000 Supplementary Survey, and previous estimates.

This figure represents an increase of about 5 million over the estimates for 1990, leading to the conclusion that the annual increase during the 1990s averaged about 500,000. Both the total number of undocumented immigrants and the annual increase are considerably higher than estimates available before 2001.

Revising Earlier Estimates

Prior to the release of data from Census 2000, there had been a widespread consensus that the undocumented population in the United States was in a rough range of 5-6 million and was increasing by 200,000-300,000 per year. The results of Census 2000 shattered this consensus as the population count of 281.4 million exceeded pre-census estimates by 5-7 million. Detailed examination of these results by demographers within the Census Bureau and elsewhere led to the conclusion that the two main sources of the high count were improved census coverage overall, and underestimation of undocumented immigration during the decade of the 1990s.

Given the preliminary nature of the estimates and the lack of detailed data on the immigrant population from Census 2000, conclusions about the nature of undocumented immigration must remain tentative. However, several factors are clearly at work. First, a successful public relations campaign surrounding Census 2000 convinced many people to participate in the census who had not been covered in previous censuses and surveys. This factor seems to have especially affected undocumented immigrants who had been in the US for some time. In addition, there appears to have been an increase in the inflow of undocumented immigrants in the late 1990s, drawn by the very successful US economy.

Sources of Undocumented Immigration

As in previous eras, Mexican and other Latin American countries account for a significant majority of the total undocumented population. Mexicans alone represent about 4.7 million or 55 percent of the total undocumented population. The rest of Latin America accounts for another 22 percent or just under 2 million undocumented immigrants, so that undocumented immigrants of Latino origin represent about three-quarters of the total. Continental Asia, from Turkey to the Philippines, has sent slightly more than 1 million undocumented immigrants.

Estimates for specific countries other than Mexico must remain provisional at this point since the requisite census data on specific countries has not been released, but some inferences can be made. Among Latin American countries, the largest sources other than Mexico are probably El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic, each accounting for 100,000-300,000. From Asia, the principal sources of undocumented immigration appear to be the same countries that send the largest numbers of legal immigrants - India, China, Korea, and the Philippines. Contrary to published reports that misinterpreted Census Bureau

How Are These New Numbers Calculated?

The methods used to develop the estimates presented are a variant of the so-called "residual" methods that have been used for almost two decades to estimate the undocumented population of the United States, beginning with Warren and Passel's work on the 1980 Census. The method essentially involves estimating the legally-resident immigrant population counted in the census using data on legal inflows from the INS, the State Department, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement together with estimates of mortality, emigration, and migration within the country.

These estimates are subtracted from the total immigrant population counted in the census (derived by excluding estimated temporary immigrants from the count) to derive an estimate of undocumented immigrants counted in the census. This subtraction step is necessary because the census data do not identify the legal status of immigrants.

Finally, using information from coverage measurement programs and various non-census sources, assumptions are made about the number of undocumented immigrants omitted from the census to arrive at an estimate of the total undocumented population. (Note: These residual estimates of the undocumented population represent any immigrants who have not been legally admitted to the U.S. as permanent residents, legal temporary immigrants, refugees, asylees, or parolees. Some individuals and groups who fall into this residual are entitled to be in the country temporarily and are not strictly deportable; some examples include asylum applicants and those with temporary protected status. These groups may represent several hundred thousand people or more.)

estimates, there do not appear to be significant numbers of undocumented immigrants from the Middle East (i.e., Arab countries of southwest Asia, Iran, and Turkey).

Destinations of Undocumented Immigrants

Consistent with previous years and not unexpectedly, California is estimated to have the largest undocumented immigrant population -- about 2.3 million or just under one-quarter of the total. Then follows Texas (1.2 million), New York and Florida (roughly 700,000 each), Illinois (500,000), and New Jersey (300,000). These top six states (which have almost 70 percent of all immigrants) have about two-thirds of the undocumented population, or 5.7 million. The remaining 44 states and the District of Columbia have about 2.9 million undocumented immigrants, or about one-third of the total.

While this pattern is not unexpected, it does represent a qualitative change in settlement patterns. Undocumented immigrants appear to have joined other immigrants in spreading over more regions of the country. Most estimates for the mid-1990s and earlier showed upwards of 40 percent of undocumented immigrants in California, and more than 80 percent in these top six states. The dispersal of undocumented immigrants throughout the country follows trends identified by Passel and Zimmermann, who noted that a higher proportion of all new immigrants in the late 1990s were settling in 'new destination' states away from these traditional settlement areas. In addition, immigrants who were already in the country were moving to the new destinations in greater numbers. Since this new settlement pattern is being led by Mexican immigrants, it is not at all surprising to find significant undocumented populations in these new areas.

As with the detailed estimates for countries, the estimates for other states are somewhat tentative, since the detailed census figures required to produce the estimates are not yet available. The major destinations beyond the top six states are Arizona (more than 200,000), Georgia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Washington, Virginia, Maryland, and Colorado (all in excess of 100,000). All of these except Washington and Massachusetts are among the 'new destination' states. Many other states have significant numbers and proportions of undocumented immigrants, but simply not enough immigrants to have more than 100,000 undocumented.

Foreign-Born Population Composition

The 8.5 million undocumented immigrants represent slightly more than one-quarter of the approximately 32 million immigrants in the United States in 2000. Among immigrants admitted as legal permanent residents, roughly as many have chosen to become US citizens through naturalization as have remained as noncitizens -- slightly less than 10 million each. About 7 percent of immigrants (2.3 million) have been admitted for humanitarian reasons as refugees, asylees, or similar groups. The remaining 1.5 million foreign-born residents have legal temporary statuses such as foreign students (F and M visas) and temporary workers (H-1B and L visas, for example).

Undocumented Immigrant Inflows

With the methods presented here, inflows of undocumented immigrants must be inferred. The estimates show that more than 6 million of the undocumented immigrants entered the US during the 1990s. During the last half of the decade, more than 700,000 per year came to the United States. This figure represents the inflow of undocumented immigrants, not the net flow of undocumented immigrants, as many depart every year and others become legal or die. The available estimates suggest that the undocumented population in 1990 was roughly 3.5 million. Thus, the change from 3.5 to 8.5 million implies an average annual net increase of 500,000, but all of the evidence points to larger increases in the latter half of the decade.

The Mexican immigrant population in the US in 2000 illustrates the nature of the inflows and changes during the 1990s. There are more than 9 million Mexican immigrants living in the United States and more than half are undocumented. However, the composition of entry cohorts varies widely -- the longer a group has been in the US, the higher the percentage of legal immigrants. Of the roughly 5 million Mexican immigrants who arrived in the US during the 1990s, about 80 percent are undocumented. Of the roughly 2.5 million arriving in the 1980s, less than 20 percent are undocumented and most of them arrived after 1986. Less than 10 percent of the pre-1980 entrants from Mexico remain undocumented. Similar patterns can be found among all groups, but Mexicans have the highest proportion undocumented.

Present and Future Trends

My initial estimates using data from the March 2001 Current Population Survey (CPS), not shown here, suggest that the trends noted above are continuing after Census 2000. The increase implied between the March 2000 and March 2001 CPS would put the undocumented population at over 9 million. There are reasons to expect a slowdown in growth or even a decrease in the undocumented population after March 2001 and the events of September 11, as life has become more difficult for all immigrants, and as the economy has slowed. However, we

must await new data from 2002 to assess the impact of September 11 and the recession on trends in the undocumented immigration.

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